THE BANGLADESH LIBERATION WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE ATROCITIES OF 1971

 the Bangladesh Liberation War: The Struggle for Independence and the Atrocities of 1971.

The Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 was a pivotal moment in the history of South Asia.

The conflict was sparked by the refusal of the government of Pakistan to recognize the results of the 1970 elections in East Pakistan, where the Awami League, a Bengali nationalist party, had won a majority of seats

In his seminal book of nonfiction, “The Blood Telegram,” Gary J. Bass scathingly remarks that the United States displayed “moral blindness” in its foreign policy by “actively and knowingly” backing Islamabad’s control over Bangladesh – then East Pakistan. His book is based on a series of telegrams sent by Archer K.

Blood, the U.S. consul general to Dhaka at the time of the war in 1971. As seen from his memoir, “The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh,” the telegrams strongly portrayed the U.S. consul’s condemnation against West Pakistani atrocities and Washington’s silence.

Sending out those telegrams staunchly criticizing American foreign policy cost Blood his coveted desire to rise to the ranks of an ambassador someday. Owing to his sacrifice, he is revered in Bangladesh to this day.

One factor that begs the attention of many is the United States’ role during Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971. Why did the United States choose to look away while its ally was involved in systematic massacres?

Blood’s memoir and Bass’s investigative reporting seek to answer that question and, in so doing, highlight how the Cold War’s great powers had a lot at stake in Bangladesh’s Liberation War.

The animosity between India and Pakistan dates back to the 1947 Partition, which cleaved the Indian subcontinent into two separate countries: On the surface, India was designated for Hindus and Pakistan – then constituted of West and East Pakistan – for Muslims.

In the period before the British Empire’s departure from India, the Indian National Congress advocated for a united subcontinent while the Muslim League wanted a separate country for the Muslims due to the presence of heavy communal tensions.

This opposition only solidified after the Partition, as territorial disputes regarding Kashmir came to the fore. By 1971, India and Pakistan had already fought two wars, in 1947 and 1965.

In 1954, Pakistan became a “double treaty ally” of the United States as it joined both CENTO and SEATO. The Eisenhower administration saw the country as one that could help Washington exert influence over South Asia by curbing the threat of communism.

India, as shown by Bass, felt threatened as the United States kept supplying arms to Pakistan, ostensibly to “ward off communists.”

According to Indian estimates, the U.S. arms supply to Pakistan over the 11-year period from 1954 to the India-Pakistan war in 1965 was worth between $1.5 billion and $2 billion.

Against this backdrop, India – an openly non-aligned country in the Cold War’s shadow – sought Soviet help for weaponry.

But taking Soviet assistance, alongside holding a stance of non-alignment and criticizing America for the Vietnam War, put India in a bad light before the United States.